



Article: The ritual around replica: From replicated works of art to art as replica (part II)

Author(s): Lucio Angelo Privitello

Source: *Objects Specialty Group Postprints, Volume Seven, 2000*

Pages: 29-41

Compilers: Virginia Greene and Jessica S. Johnson

© 2000 by The American Institute for Conservation of Historic & Artistic Works, 1156 15th Street NW, Suite 320, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 452-9545

www.conservation-us.org

Under a licensing agreement, individual authors retain copyright to their work and extend publications rights to the American Institute for Conservation.

Objects Specialty Group Postprints is published annually by the Objects Specialty Group (OSG) of the American Institute for Conservation of Historic & Artistic Works (AIC). A membership benefit of the Objects Specialty Group, *Objects Specialty Group Postprints* is mainly comprised of papers presented at OSG sessions at AIC Annual Meetings and is intended to inform and educate conservation-related disciplines.

Papers presented in *Objects Specialty Group Postprints, Volume Seven, 2000* have been edited for clarity and content but have not undergone a formal process of peer review. This publication is primarily intended for the members of the Objects Specialty Group of the American Institute for Conservation of Historic & Artistic Works. Responsibility for the methods and materials described herein rests solely with the authors, whose articles should not be considered official statements of the OSG or the AIC. The OSG is an approved division of the AIC but does not necessarily represent the AIC policy or opinions.

THE RITUAL AROUND REPLICA: FROM REPLICATED WORKS OF ART TO ART AS REPLICA (Part II)

Lucio Angelo Privitello

"Art is the historical-philosophical truth of solipsism, that in itself is false"
T.W. Adorno (1975: 73).

A short version of this paper was presented as a seven minute Video at the AIC 'Objects Group' meeting. Then, as now, my aim was to raise questions on the conceptual status of a replica, and allow a glimpse at theoretical implications if such questions were more fully pursued.

A replica is an excitable object. A replica comes to the philosophical questions of the 'Being' and 'Time' of originality stripped of its romanticism, its *Sturm und Drang*. An original holds fast against having its 'cue' (*entrée réplique*) uncovered. A 'replica', by definition and by acting on a 'cue,' questions the 'thing-in-itself' thought to be hidden within the spaces of an 'original's' miraculous escape from exchange. A replica enters the economy of exchange historicised and fully conscious, whereas an original hides this exchange that dwells as its unconscious debt. Within that space the replica vibrates, therein it is excitable, and from within that space the replica takes the place where nine-tenths of the idea of the idea of original 'property' is put into question. Yet, a replica persists in possessing a property of what it signifies, while questioning the solipsism of art's historical-philosophical 'truth,' as the above epigram from Adorno states. Is the 'truth' of art that it is a replication? And if replication is a kind of repetition, is it, as Kierkegaard thought, a place "when ideality and reality touch each other" (Kierkegaard 1983: 275)? In a way, a replica is a perpetuation of the original as a ritual and ceremony. A replica is an invested and saturated point of the ceremony of the life-history of an original. It is, as Kierkegaard felt a 'forward recollection' (Kierkegaard 1983:131).

A replica allows for shadows to be cast within the lighting reverently retained for "original" works. A replica is the materialist in the idealist camp of art. It is able to cast these shadows by revealing levels of conceptualization. Levels of conceptualizations can be seen as technical retakes, theoretical cues, contextual transformations, or historical citations. They make up the spaces from where one enters the 'story' of an object that while fascinating can be detached from the aura of aesthetic somnambulism. This detachment is where the work of art makes an about-face, where the ritual of aesthetic production exposes itself to the political grounds that sustain it. From mystery one gains a view of the struggles of mastery. A replica is that which enhances, and what foreshadows this view (Frank 1989; Davis 1995). These shadows allow us to measure the problematic concept of "intention," seen teleologically, since we cannot interpretatively scale intentions since objects, and texts are fundamentally mute about their openendedness. They are always the 'coming attraction'. I will call this the 'Thales replica effect'. Thales was said to have been the first individual to measure the height of a pyramid by "having observed the time when our shadow is equal to our height" (Kirk, Raven, Schofield 1983:84-85). With an original we are

Privitello

in a similar position, we scale it by the shadow that it casts and that only in relation to our time in its narrative time.

A replica can also be a work of art's secret agent. A replica allows one to determine if a work has accomplished or failed at the post-creative-partum of 'intention,' a crowning product of the involvement of art historians, curators, and conservators. A replica may also be a work of art's *doppelgänger*, its "mirror-image" which can at times work at cross-purposes with it, adding the climax of a catastrophic meeting so familiar in the works literary works of E.T.A. Hoffman, and in Dostoyevsky's character Ivan in *The Brothers Karamasov*. Seen in this way, a replica reveals an 'intention' previously unnoticed, or un-adopted. A replica can also be an original's prosthetic, as seen in the works of Sherrie Levine, Lucio Pozzi, Elaine Sturtevant, and Douglass Davis, just to name a few. It is also clear that it is not possible to defend the position that a replica, in the cases just mentioned, doesn't feel the phantom pain of an original. Actually, a replica is an extension of the body-schema of an original, and within the considerations of conservators and curators much pain goes into caring for and about them. This is where comparisons can be studied, and where a rethinking of standards and practices of which 'intentionality' is most problematic, gains a fresh impetus for technical, conceptual, art historical and scientific re-discoveries. A replica is a tool for such reevaluations of reasons and judgments in the sciences and no less so in the arts. A replica is the Devil of a narrative's details. It is a phenomenon rich and saturated with history, and *contra* Benjamin, "*aura is an artifact of history*" (Margolis 1999:116-117).

Apart from Hillel Schwartz's *The Culture of the Copy: Striking Likenesses, Unreasonable Facsimiles* (1996), little has been seriously written about the phenomenon of 'replica'. Even less has been hitherto written about it as a phenomenology of the replica. This is mostly due to its misappropriation under the mythic lights of "original". This initial misappropriation set the investigation back into the "Genetic" trap that was pointed out by Monroe Beardsley 1981: 457-460). The 'Genetic' trap is when a work "refers to something existing before the work itself, to the manner in which it was produced, or its connection with antecedent objects and psychological states" (Beardsley 1981: 457). A replica isn't there to show how an original set out to accomplish its intention. Intention is but the crowing of ideas from practices of a community of culturally involved agents. A replica reveals how an original lacks intention, in having always already given its best intentions away.

An example of the misappropriation of the effect of the replica is seen in the 1985 text edited by Kathleen Preciado entitled, *Retaining the Original: Multiple Originals, Copies, and Reproductions*. Only two out of the thirteen articles collected mention the term replica as part of their title, while the collection of articles set replica squarely back into the "Genetic" trap of an original's intention. In the article, "Copying in Roman Sculpture: The Replica Series," by Miranda Marvin, (Preciado 1985: 29-45), no serious thought has been given to the social *a priori* concept of the replica. Instead, we receive a detailed view of Cicero's requests and dealings for sculptures at his Tusculum villa. Based on a closer look at Ciceronian ideals in both the arts and more importantly in rhetoric, a replica is an object that imports the surroundings of a once intact

Privitello

original as an exercise in the emulation of character. For Cicero, the replica is what constantly bedevils one of the past as a time only filled by the presence of the present. A replica, for Cicero, was a learning device to focus one's powers on a cultural reinvention based on the personality that orchestrates. This view was already mentioned by Plato, especially in his dialogue *Sophist* (235d-236a), and *Republic*, Books II, III and X. A replica is a spark for moral regeneration and emulation. It is the closest one can come to the lofty enactment of the Platonic Forms, and for Cicero, served as the bond for a social *a priori* where each individual may fully realize their particular forming of the ideal 'Form' of the social fabric. Cicero anticipated what many call postmodernism by centuries in his theory of personality absorption cut adrift from the anchors of historical time. The hybrid was born, and acculturation found its nemesis; that a culture is the replication of what a culture lacks: more time. Replication exposes the seductive hypocrisy of 'givenness' by how it reveals that value is an understanding begotten through reproduction rather than the consumptive production of an effort.

Something similar applies to the so-called "workshop replica" (Brown 1985: 111-124), where assistants, in this case to Paolo Veronese, worked along with the master, and prepared versions of his canvases "replicated...for the mass market" (Brown 1985:112), but also seeking an internalization of the ideals and gestures of the master; again to give them more time. A replica is a door that allows access to the life-world of a style. Without the replica there is no learning of the trade. Brown's article, "Replication and the Art of Veronese" seeks to define 'replication' along these lines by pointing out the differences between "copy," "autograph replica," and "workshop [bottega] replica," each outlined against the original of "*di sua mano*" quality. The theoretical outcome of this unfortunately anchored derivation is that certain pieces are considered less 'original' than others, in the ascending order, "copy," "workshop replica," "autograph replica". Instead of viewing a replica in the straightjacket fashion of original Inc., it would be more fruitful to perceive the phenomena of the replica as investments from which so-called originals eventually profit. At this point it would be well worth comparing the positions of the critical theorist T.W. Adorno (1975: 72-73, 91-96, 288-290), with that of the Marxist theorist G. Lukács (1973:148-176). For Lukács, without a mechanical mirroring of the dialectic of phenomena and essence, or art as the reaction and copy of the external work, it would be impossible to be oriented in life. He felt that this was always part of our most basic perceptions that seek to establish the relation between forms of consciousness and the objective world. Adorno's position opposes this, seeing art is the refuge from mimetic behavior. Lukács misses the point in his critique of modern art's formal qualities because of his dogmatic unity of universal and particular, where a place is left standing of some desperate idea of a "normal work of art" (Adorno 1975:16). The master's hand is left standing in the critique of Lukács, whereas in Adorno, the hand that seeks mastery is problematized by the erasures that it leaves upon the work it seeks to totalize. For Lukács the original is found in pieces everywhere. For Adorno the original is the wake of its consumed marketability.

Upon closer study, an "autograph replica" is not quite an "original replica," as the *Paola and Francesca* of Ingres (Krauss 1985: 151-179), points out. Or is it? In the Krauss article, it is

Privitello

implied that to "replicate" is to make a "multiple copy". If this "multiple copy" is executed by the Master's hand, it is also then an "original replica". Why then is this not also an "autograph replica"? This perpetual shifting about of the concept of "replica" is what I will call a replica's inherent metonymy. It makes up part of the *levels of authenticity* that an "original" already performs upon the fabric of historical and art historical references. Certain critics see the reworking of Ingres' own work as an "auto-plagiarism," while Krauss sees it as a "practice of seriality". In this arena of study, "seriality" is a far better term than that of "multiple originals". "Seriality" comes closer to how the work of art's *effects* shows its dependency on replication *tout court*. It is replication that, *contra* Walter Benjamin, is aura. The replica is merely the embodiment of replication's curse on the hubris of the original. It is the hero that rips through the tightening backdrop fabric of artistic style and technical achievements to find itself staring at its own strings, at the mechanisms that figured it, and that made it dance. The replica is the repetition as "acting out" of this trauma of the original. The original is rewarded for the work that the replica and endless replication has on the analysis of a work's moment in historical time. A replica is a stripping in-itself whereas an original is what wears itself out as the icon that it will shrink back from. Replication is the precondition for an origin, and enshrines the icon within the delicate arch reminding us that aesthetic childhood has past.

Barely beyond these social ties, the replica is the operation of dissemination rendered as an object to be enjoyed again and again, while capturing the "mark [that] is structurally multiple and [which] cut[s] off from itself in advance, form[ing] the thrust of a philosophical argument that has great resonance with any discussion of models and multiples..." (Krauss 1985: 157).

The ritual around replica is played out in these parameters, parameters embraced by a museum culture, where bets are cast on concepts such as original, copy, multiple originals, (which are isomorphic copies, the artistic 'serial'), replicas, and art works made as replica. Yet, it is all placed under the vitrine of culture. The mythic light of 'original' is softened by these rich shadows that are cast as the ensemble of questionable objects, but it is the museum that first and foremost engulfs the presentation itself as 'original'. Such a context can be compared to what in scientific practice is known as "perfect, or exact replication" (a myth, no doubt), which serves as a standard for reliable research. The concept of 'replica' is still held prisoner within these parameters.

In museum culture, each institution measures itself against the setting of the "history of art". This concept of "art history" lies within museums as the promise of an adequation from outside. It is where the setting of the museum, and where the analysis of the collection works as a narrative thread or as a quantitative count of parameters, which will, in the long run, be deemed art historically worthy. It is only when one or the other of these settings, (the within or without), are determined that a notion of replication can be defined. In a modernist tradition the 'inside' claim was too rich, situating the 'outside' as extension of its measure, whereas in a postmodernist vein, the 'inside' poverty is not yet great enough for anyone on the 'outside' to be deemed a suitable patron. Replication is to work within one of these chosen vocabularies and practice, which *in media res*, show them both to be false, since vocabularies and practices base themselves on little

Privitello

else than repeatable observations. In museum culture these vocabularies and practice more readily, (and must readily), feed the ever hungry concept of original, whereas in a scientific community it would extend the original into the aura of replicability. The ability to replicate guarantees success for the 'truth' of shared scientific knowledge, whereas in the world of art, (history of art, museum culture), it can be seen as an undermining of the function of an original. "In a sense replicas do not exist at all, since their being derives entirely from other objects, but in another sense they have an enhanced or double meaning" (Millhauser 1995:50).

This is where the aforementioned *doppelgänger* of the work of art, its secret and diabolical agent, come into play. This is the replica as a tool that accomplishes what is not yet manifest in the trauma of the original. Its explicit dependency, while revealing that implicitly it's interpretation is truth. It is in this sense that a replica is, as Millhauser noted, a "haunted object," haunted by the epistemological limits that it must drag about as chains to any truth-value statements made within the aesthetic mansion that it ceaselessly travels. A replica is an attempt at understanding the *ontological* status of works of art, which it greets in the tatters of its *ontic* robes. It alone is the 'truth' of the 'being' of the original's temporal meaning. Replication is a study of what makes up the ground of the nomination of the original. Yet, a replica seeks to undermine the fetishism of the very original that it admires, leveling the notion of transcendence that museum culture wears as a mask (Adorno 1981:175-185; Sherman, Rogoff 1994:123-139).

The original is part of this syndrome. It is a masked replication. It is this masking by including intermediary documents, imported mediums and contacts with various traditions that are entwined onto the forming of its location in a social *a priori*.¹ The composing of these parts, which are forms of operational replications, contribute to a whole to which the idea of original also belongs, as art to non-fiction.² An original always already marked its replicability as its historical necessity. A parallel can be easily seen by studying the genre of biography that has its versions, updates, omissions, rediscoveries, and re-inventions. The structure of replica instead is the paradoxical reenactments of singularity and a critique of the autonomy of the 'original' based on the consumption of works seen as "new" or as wish-fulfillment, as in blockbuster exhibitions. The original is a mourning for historical loss, whereas the replica is the melancholy of that loss.

In a strict sense, bodily identity is the first object that calls for *compensation of loss*, whether in part or whole. This can be seen in the example noted in Part I of the Argand lamps or the William Rush 1825 sculptures replicated in 1978. The former is an example of how replica is a replacement of a narrative space. The latter is a fine example of the replica as equivalence of use. In a community driven to preserve, the ground to the conceptual sense of replication, (whether as narrative space or use), lies in the retaining of singular intention in parts in-and-as the cultural *a priori* of the whole. But the shift from one to the other is also a shift in how one reads the term replica. A paradox will also surface when the call for preservation must allow exposing said intentions to serial processes.³ On a more somber reading, replication can be seen as a technique *qua* work of art, which renders unto history history's dues. Exposing itself as the "fill" *and* the object to be conserved, this technique is the provocation of the 'counter-concept' that inhabits the

Privitello

art world and that makes up the concept which is cherished as the beloved original. Because of these issues within the ritual around replica, it is advisable to note what a condensed history of the term "replica" may tell us about these dilemmas. Following the advice of Ludwig Wittgenstein, "sometimes an expression [or term] has to be withdrawn from language and sent for cleaning, - then it can be put back into circulation" (Wittgenstein 1980:23e).

"Replica" began as rhetorical device expressing identity in narratives. Today it is used in methodology studies in the philosophy of science, statistical psychiatry and physics. 'Replica' from the Latin term *repetitio* and *repeto* means 'ask again,' 'take steps to recover,' or 'seek to restore to a condition'. This term points to a prior model reflected in the linguistic root of the Greek term $\alpha\nu\alpha\phi\omicron\rho\alpha$ (anaphora), meaning 'appeal,' 'recourse,' or 'reference'. The use of the term 'anaphora' in figures of speech is specifically directed at a repetition of beginnings. Its use makes the 'subject' or 'action' memorable, yet the 'repetition' of the term could not be considered a 'replica' since the sentence which follows is usually added to expand the conceptual field of reference. It is in the French that the etymology of 'replica' (*réplique*) is used to its fullest, in conversation, in theater and in the arts (Imbs 1973). Because of this, Duchamp as a phenomenon was bound to happen as the epitome of *donner la réplique*, which means the perfect timing of a response given when and only when another plays opposite. Little wonder that Duchamp left art for chess, threw a urinal in the face of those who later will admire it, and left close to a dozen *Paris Air* readymades (Margolis 1980: 85-86; Naumann 1999).

If the common definition of "replica" as an "exact copy of a work of art" (Turner 1996: vol. 26, p. 221), is retained, then the entanglements of the issues that replicability has within the scientific methodology will continue to plague art history. One of these entanglements entails the confirmation and corroboration of competent agents and experimental conditions. In the aura that perpetually sustains works of art, this can be seen as something "artificially possessed by the object" (Margolis 1980: 86). But this is the trumping up of intentions by conclusions from given experiments, (art historical thesis), and whether said conclusions can be observed, (or repeated), under identical circumstances. Museum culture makes sure this will be as close to the case as one can come, hence the 'inside' overtaking any and all unadequated 'outside'. What will be made of the subject matter of the experiment, (or art historical thesis), will also determine if the validity, or not, of the 'object' does in fact possess said artifactual quality. The circularity is astounding, and replicas merely point out that notion. This is the exposure of what Adorno called "the historical-philosophical truth of solipsism, that in itself is false" (Adorno 1975: 73).

In the subject matter of art the replica causes a more dialectical process in the study of what can be considered the "same". A replica and replication is the movement of the dialectic, its center notion, which is mixed with the vacuity of the original's Being, as it is with its own Not Being the original. The subject matter of art, of which the work of art is a symptom, bars strict originality because replicated data is constantly being used and reinterpreted. The history of the subject, the unfolding of its history is a becoming replete with expectations, creating instability for the study of strict-original as it does for strict-replication.

Instead, a replica is a methodological response to a search for an author-effect, and is a reevaluation of knowledge claims. This can be seen in artist-curated shows (Orozco 1999), which call for a discussion of a dialectical nature as the key player of the exhibited product. In this case a replica is the thread of cognitive occurrence stretched to the limits of its pile. The thought as technique comes to its limit, and only worship is next in line as a saturated phenomenon, or with any amount of luck, of reflexive critique. Both are rites. Yet, at no point is there an unavailable original to such an unworking or dream of a Platonic Form, forever out of reach, forever haunting, forever desired. An original is the price that a replica pays for trying too hard. This is how one reconstructs objects in, from and as having a tradition. These are construed by intermediary documents that *refer* to *meanings*, otherwise known as original aspects in an ongoing negotiation prey to a collective objective or "method effect" (van der Veer *et. al.* 1994: 25, 94, 100-104).

Original is an epistemological *meaning*, whereas replication is a methodological *reference*, where meaning may differ by the variation of the referents, just as learning new sets of rules will form new kinds of judgments and games. This would be the conceptual sense of the possibility of replication as the very grounds where originals are born. A replica is not a reasonable substitute for an original, but is it the reason for an original in-and-as the first place. An original is the mark of the historical destiny of the individual folded back into the work that has turned its face from the market that permits its sale.⁴ This is where a replica finds re-pose. The rest is, paradoxically, in the very disturbance around the re-execution of the original, which is the excitable object.

A replica's having form, its material perseverance, is a play within this conceptual play of *levels of authenticity*. Because of the cognitive occurrence at the limits of testability, deception itself gains the methodological importance it always had, psychologically speaking. This would raise replica to the status, already mentioned, of the *doppelgänger*, and with it sublimation, screen memories, displacement, and condensation would enter into their own as factors in a list of conceptual replication. Within this list, the original object would be just one of many points of references behind the Oz-like scrim of ongoing *adequation* to an original trauma. The intervention sought in these relations, (and not unlike that of the construction of a Period Room), is the stabilization of the name of the further back as legacy, by the preservation of materials in future time. Yet, these forms of preservation are also being challenged by techniques difficult to preserve as seen in Anderson (2000). Replication, as seen in Period rooms, and counter to the examples from Anderson (2000), is the adhesive for the temporal dialogue where enculturation is its product. In this kind of event, and as George Santayana wrote, "to observe a recurrence is to divine a mechanism" (Schwartz 1996: 291, 192-199). In the "media-saturated world" this is reversed, it is where we seek to observe the divine as the recurrence of the mechanism. The worship factor that was next in line as a saturated phenomenon, at the breakdown of the engulfed product in the narrative space of being hyper-exhibited, now becomes the rites of visitation-passages encircling a critique in the practice of a metaphysical homelessness. The heart of 'original' has stopped beating, and the mechanism we divine is intimated by our capture within good curatorship, and even greater conservation techniques.

Privitello

To contribute in the formation of this mechanism, as recurrent or repeatable effects, is to allow for the potential of an intimation of *originality* and its *reproducibility*. The conservator plays the role of another effect of the absent author of this volley. A replica's power of production is but an original's perverse fantasy of perpetual reproducibility. "What eats away at the life of an artwork is also its own life" (Adorno 1981: 184). A replica is part of the life of an artwork, its most excitable part, the part that is closest to the process of having rethought its own practices and its place in the ongoing show of the work fully historicized. An original is metonymic seizure. It is the point where the work has run out of things to emulate, and that is only after it has been ideated upon the edges of the replication of what was already stretched to the limits of its theoretical and practical fabric.

An original is situated in this play of levels and edges of authenticity. A 'copy,' unlike a replica is that which does not participate in the play, that which has nothing to gain by the loss it could incur if it had instead played into the space and time of the imaging of a forever after. A copy is that which is taken out of circulation from the annals of art historical practices, whereas a replica is a copy that enters into the repetition of the trauma of the original. A copy is a duplication; a replica is an emulation. The forever after of all originals is *metonymic replication*. It is the differal of signification by a trope that denotes an object that it does not literally refer to, yet to which it can be linked. In keeping with what Walter Benjamin stated, "one of the foremost tasks of art has been the creation of a demand which could be fully satisfied only later" (Benjamin 1969: 237). The object of art dreams replica at the summit of its dialectical stage, and as the very myth that creates the foundations of its rites. This would be the anaphoric quality of beginning again, within a history already begun. This is where replicas are the very grounds where originals are born, where they take their first steps in place of a creation *ex nihilo*. There is none, as there are no originals that are not first product of the limits of replication.

Within this chasm, the line that divides what *refers* (metonymic replication) from what *substitutes* (metaphoric replication) is where the work of *criteria* must be founded and questioned. If the object of comparison is not clear then historical reconstruction is open to the charges of a 'programmatic hypothesis,' meaning that the evidence of an original becomes a *metaphorical replication*, a substitution *in absentia*. In this case, the work is a *tableau vivant* of the very practices of its documentation, and where even beautifully crafted, is wholly embraced by the problem it longingly turns to address, only to there find itself rendered mute.

The Hellenistic copying of masterpieces, Cicero's villa at Tusculum, the 19th Museum of Copies in Paris, the Victoria and Albert cast court, and re-creations in the Diaspora Museum in Tel Aviv set the idea of original into the space and time of a forever after. In that space the replica enhances the original's power of reproducibility, while deconstructing the spatio-temporal frame of reference, their cultural-specific emergence. The opening that is created, the chasm, gives a voice to the observer to come, the futural more writerly viewers not present to the object that has come before, and is thus an *authentic replacement*. The replica addresses the power of the immaterial substance of an object's temporality by how the gaps in production between original and replica

Privitello

become part of the viewing experience.⁵ The gap as chasm is sustained. A replica is thus about the identity of excitable time.

Replica is the *enfant terrible* of art history. It has been asked the fatal question, 'what can you give up and still be you?' and responds: the original (Schwartz 1996: 320). The replica is the *identity* where accountability and expectation are necessitated without contradicting the laws of identity. A replica questions the logic of the original by showing the grounds from which that logic operates. Replication, the art and ritual around replicas is the offer of the construction of knowledge as the question of 'style' and is the question of the ability of continued production and research.

Originals are a halt in the play of history, a syncopation in the voice of creativity, which, hoping for an ecstatic level, pay for their rise by the production of the replica that gives them the breath for their syncopation to last indefinitely. Originals are the hope of the broken, of the loss and of the chasm that is slowly closing. It is a history made to recede in the hopes that a glimpse will be cast back as a repetition of a true identifiable heritage that must be endlessly and quite impossibly compensated for.

Endnotes

1. The term 'original, from 'originale,' comes from the Latin *exemplum*, which derives from *eximo*. It is that which is chosen for its homogeneous qualities and from its being dug out or taken from a site. On a reading of total mimesis there would be no original to return to, no object itself, in contrast to the charitable ideals of recovery seen in Gabriel Orozco's statement (Orozco 1999).

2. See also Tessa DeCarlo's review of the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art exhibition "Fact/Fiction: Contemporary Art That Walks the Line," in *The New York Times*, April 9, 2000, entitled "Laying Bare the Uncertain Underside of the Truth". On a strong reading of the sublimation of real and fake, the concepts of "disguise and deceit" would also be sublimated, along with any other higher truth. This would leave Cindy Sherman's 1970 Stills and Yasumasa Morimura's 1996 self-portraits with no outside reference, nor potential for reinvention since the criteria for knowing would itself be blurred. Sherrie Levine's 1981 "copies" of two Walker Evans photographs would in this case be x-propriations rather than 'appropriations'. In art, logic is always at its most savage state, and very few individuals follow it out of epistemic fear. It is in the work of Tina Barney that we come face to face with this upshot, for according to this outline, the only thing that remains from her photographs that does not deceive is 'anxiety'. Anxiety is possibly the only criteria that may serve as a way to judge the properties and sedimentations of which the art work, after all, works as its art.

Privitello

3. See also *Reconstructing the Mind: Replicability in Research on Human Development*. Rene van der Veer, Marinus van Ijzendoorn and Jaan Valsiner, eds. New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1994, pp. 167-168.

4. The works of the French performance artist Orlan can be seen in this way, (Smith 1993:C31), as well as the implications of the work of William Laziza (Powers 2000), and the more theoretically laden situationalist architect Constant Nieuwenhuys (Muschamp 1999). See also Arnold Hauser (1951) *The Social History of Art*, vol. 1, pp. 105, 109, 266.

5. Compare the 1:10 scale sculptures of Karin Sander (D'Amelio Terras Gallery, NYC, May 2000), or the sculptures of David Levinthal, Jeff Koons, or Claes Oldenburg, that work with scale as the transformation of surrounding contexts through perception.

References

Adorno, T.W. 1981. *Prisms*. Trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Adorno, T.W. 1975. *Teoria Estetica*. Trans. Enrico De Angelis. Torino: Piccola Biblioteca Einaudi.

Anderson, Maxwell, L. 2000. "Preserving the Perishable Art of the Digital Age," in *The New York Times*, Sunday, September 24.

Beardsley, M. 1981. *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

Benjamin, Walter. 1969. *Illuminations*. Trans. Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken Books.

Boxer, Sarah. 2000. "When Truth Challenges Fiction and Becomes Art," *The New York Times*, Monday, May 8.

Brown, L. B. 1989. "Replication and the Art of Veronese," in K. Preciado (Ed.) *Retaining the Original: Multiple Originals, Copies, and Reproductions*. Studies in the History of Art. Vol. 20. National Gallery of Art, Washington. New England: University Press.

Davis, Douglass. 1995. "The Work of Art in the Age of Digital Reproduction," in *Leonardo*, Vol. 28, No. 5.

DeCarlo, Tessa. 2000. "Laying Bare the Uncertain Underside of the Truth," *The New York Times*, Sunday, April 9.

Privitello

Ebony, David. 2000. "Technology, Capital, Nihilism and Love: Recent Works by Gabriel Orozco and Alain Badiou," in *lacanian ink*, Vol. 16, Spring.

Eco, Umberto. 1990. "The Experience of Time in Art," in *The Journal of Art*, Vol. 3, October.

Frank, Patrick. 1989. "Recasting Benjamin's Aura," in *New Art Examiner*, Vol. 16, No. 7.

Goldberger, Paul. 1996. "Genuine Appreciation Fostered by Bogus Art," in *The New York Times*, Tuesday, November 19.

Hauser, Arnold. 1951. *The Social History of Art*, Vol. 1. Trans. Stanley Godman. New York: Vintage Books.

Imbus, Paul. 1973. *Trésor de la Langue Française*. Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique.

Indiana, Gary. 1987. "Faking It," in *The Village Voice*, Vol. 33, No. 52, December 29.

Karlen, Peter, H. 1983. "Aesthetic Quality and Art Preservation," in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Vol. 41, No. 3.

Kierkegaard, Soren. 1983. *Fear and Trembling. Repetition*. Trans. H.V. Hong and E.H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kimmelman, Michael. 1991. "Absolutely Real? Absolutely Fake?" *The New York Times*, Sunday, August 4.

Kirk, G.S. Raven, J.E. Schofield, M. 1983. *The Presocratic Philosophers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Krauss, R.E. 1989. "You Irreplaceable You," in K. Preciado (Ed.) *Retaining the Original: Multiple Originals, Copies, and Reproductions*. Studies in the History of Art. Vol. 20. National Gallery of Art, Washington. New England: University Press.

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1967. *Structural Anthropology*. Trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf. Garden City: Anchor Books.

Lukács, G. 1973. *Estetica*. Vols. 1 and 2. Trans. Anna Solmi. Torino: Piccola Biblioteca Einaudi.

Margolis, Joseph. 1999. *What, After All, Is a Work of Art?* University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Privitello

McGill, Douglas, C. 1987. "Plaster Cast of Statutes: From Storage Into Vogue," *The New York Times*, Thursday, January 1.

Millhauser, Steven. 1995. "Replicas". *The Yale Review*. Vol. 83, No. 3.

Morreall, John, S. 1980. "Penelhum's Replica Objection," *Philosophical Studies*. Vol. 25.

Muschamp, Herbert. 1999. "Tinkertoy Fantasy for a City of Unquenchable Desire," in *The New York Times*, Friday, December 3.

Naumann, Francis. M. 1999. *Marcel Duchamp: The Art of Making Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*. New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc.

Orozco, Gabriel. 1999. "Photogravity," *Museum Studies* 5, Philadelphia Museum of Art, October 27-December 12.

Powers, Ann. 2000. "The Artists Formerly Known as Spectator," in *The New York Times*, Saturday, January 1.

Preciado, Kathleen. 1989. *Retaining the Original: Multiple Copies, and Reproductions*. Studies in the History of Art. Vol. 20. National Gallery of Art, Washington. New England: University Press.

Russel, John. 1985. "In Search of the Real Thing". *The New York Times*, Sunday, December 1.

Schwartz, Hillel. 1996. *The Culture of the Copy: Striking Likenesses, Unreasonable Facsimiles*. New York: Zone Books.

Shapiro, Alan. 2000. "Captain Kirk Was Never the Original," at *ctheory.com*.

Sherman, D. J. and Rogoff, I. 1994. *Museum Culture: Histories, Discourses, Spectacles*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Smith, Roberta. 1993. "Surgical Sculpture: The Body as Costume," in *The New York Times*, Friday, December 17.

Turner, Jane, ed. 1996. *The Dictionary of Art*. New York: Macmillan Publishers Limited.

Unger, Miles. 2000. "Tales of Intrigue for a Museum of Unnatural History," *The New York Times*, Sunday, Feb 6.

Privitello

Van der Veer, R., van Ijzendoorn, M., Valsiner, J. (Eds.) 1994. *Reconstructing the Mind: Replicability in Research on Human Development*. Norwood: Ablex Publishing Corporation.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1980. *Culture and Value*. Trans. Peter Winch. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Author's Address

Lucio Angelo Privitello, Department of Philosophy, Villanova University, Villanova, PA. 19085-1699. E-mail: lucioangelo@earthlink.net